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  The	  term	  “sensation”	  (Empfindung)	  famously	  displays	  an	  act/object	  ambiguity.	  It	  might	  be	  used	  to	  refer:	  	  
1.	   To	  our	  sensing	  of	  something:	  a	  sensory	  act	  (e.g.,	  a	  hearing);	  	  2.	   To	  what	  we	  sense:	  a	  sensory	  object	  (e.g.,	  a	  sound);	  	  3.	   To	  some	  mental	  episode	  of	  ours	  having	  no	  object	  distinct	  from	  itself.	  Pain	  is	  sometimes	  said	  to	  be	  such	  a	  “subjectively	  subjective”	  mental	  episode,	  some	  sensing	  which	  is	  its	  own	  sensa.i	  	  
In	  his	  relentless	  prowl	  for	  act/object	  conflations,	  Brentano	  systematically	  uses	  “sensation”	  in	  the	  first	  sense,	  to	  denote	  only	  sensory	  acts	  –	  hearings,	  smellings,	  seeings,	  etc.	  Each	  sensation	  bears	  on	  something	  distinct	  from	  itself,	  which	  Brentano	  calls	  its	  sensory	  object	  or	  content.	  There	  is	  no	  “subjectively	  subjective”	  mental	  episode	  for	  Brentano:	  no	  sensation,	  not	  even	  pain,	  is	  purely	  self-­‐reflexive,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  referring	  to	  itself	  only.	  Sensations	  are	  all	  intentional,	  and	  therefore	  mental.	  
While	  sensations	  are	  mental	  phenomena,	  their	  objects	  are	  physical	  phenomena	  (in	  Brentano’s	  idiosyncratic	  sense,	  which	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  physical	  objects	  exist	  in	  reality,	  apart	  from	  being	  apprehended	  by	  sensations;	  see	  CHAP.	  22).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  superficially	  similar	  expressions	  “a	  sensation	  of	  sound”	  and	  “a	  sensation	  of	  hearing”	  have	  fundamentally	  different	  structures:	  in	  “a	  sensation	  of	  sound”	  the	  “of”	  is	  intentional	  (as	  in	  “the	  seeing	  of	  a	  tree”;	  “the	  remembering	  of	  a	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concert”);	  but	  in	  “a	  sensation	  of	  hearing”,	  the	  “of”	  is	  specificatory	  (as	  in	  a	  “piece	  of	  cake”;	  “a	  textbook	  of	  psychology”).	  
Brentano	  discusses	  sensations	  and	  sensory	  qualities	  abundantly;	  such	  discussions	  are	  found	  in	  his	  psychological	  as	  well	  as	  in	  his	  metaphysical	  works,	  in	  his	  earlier	  as	  well	  as	  later	  works	  (1907,	  	  1981a,	  1981b,	  1988,	  1995a,	  1995b,	  2009).	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact,	  first,	  that	  he	  takes	  sensations	  and	  sensory	  qualities	  to	  be	  
fundamental	  mental	  and	  physical	  phenomena	  (as	  we	  shall	  see),	  and	  second,	  that	  although	  he	  denies	  the	  reality	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  and	  objects,	  he	  amply	  uses	  them	  as	  paradigmatic	  examples	  to	  introduce	  his	  metaphysical	  views	  through.	  	  
Sensations	  have	  two	  kinds	  of	  features.	  Some,	  such	  as	  their	  intentional	  mode,	  or	  their	  temporal	  features,	  cannot	  be	  explained	  away	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  object.	  Others,	  such	  as	  their	  intensity	  or	  the	  difference	  between	  senses,	  are	  features	  that	  sensations	  inherit	  from	  their	  objects.	  	  
Accordingly,	  this	  chapter	  has	  three	  sections.	  The	  first	  introduces	  Brentano’s	  view	  of	  sensations	  by	  presenting	  the	  intentional	  features	  of	  sensations	  irreducible	  to	  features	  of	  the	  sensory	  objects.	  The	  second	  presents	  Brentano’s	  view	  of	  sensory	  
objects	  —which	  include	  sensory	  qualities—	  and	  the	  features	  of	  sensations	  that	  such	  objects	  allow	  to	  explain,	  such	  as	  their	  intensity.	  The	  third	  section	  presents	  Brentano’s	  approach	  to	  sensory	  pleasures	  and	  pains,	  which	  combines	  both	  appeal	  to	  specific	  modes	  of	  reference	  and	  to	  specific	  sensory	  qualities.	  	  
1.	  	  Sensations	  	  	  Sensations	  are	  mental	  acts	  which	  are	  intentionally	  directed	  at	  sensory	  objects.	  Brentano	  calls	  such	  objects	  “concrete”,	  but	  these	  are	  not	  concrete	  objects	  such	  as	  lemons,	  persons	  or	  mountains.	  Sensory	  objects	  are	  rather	  colour	  spots,	  sounds,	  smells,	  etc.	  These	  constitute	  the	  primary	  objects	  of	  sensations.	  Thus	  seeing,	  hearing,	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etc.	  are	  sensations	  intentionally	  directed	  towards	  colour	  spots,	  localized	  sounds,	  etc.	  as	  their	  primary	  objects.	  	  
Sensations	  are	  also	  their	  own	  secondary	  objects,	  in	  conformity	  with	  Brentano’s	  doctrine	  that	  mental	  acts	  essentially	  have	  two	  objects:	  an	  object	  distinct	  from	  themselves	  (the	  primary	  object);	  and	  themselves	  (the	  secondary	  object)	  (see	  CHAP.	  5).	  Together	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  colour	  spot,	  we	  have	  the	  presentation	  of	  that	  presentation	  (1995a:	  127-­‐8;	  1995b:	  25;	  1981b:	  41).	  
Sensations	  are,	  furthermore,	  fundamental	  mental	  acts	  (1995b:	  91),	  by	  contrast	  to	  superposed	  acts,	  which	  depend	  on	  fundamental	  acts.	  Thus	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  colour	  presupposes	  some	  sensory	  presentation	  of	  a	  concrete	  instance	  thereof,	  and	  is	  thus	  superposed.	  But	  that	  latter	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  any	  other	  presentation,	  and	  is	  thus	  fundamental.	  	  
Sensations	  are,	  third,	  the	  only	  fundamental	  acts,	  and	  all	  general	  presentations	  are	  superposed	  on	  them	  (1995b:	  149).	  This	  constitutes	  a	  substantive	  empiricist	  strand	  in	  Brentano’s	  thought	  (see	  Chrudzimski	  2001:	  71ff).	  
How	  do	  sensations	  refer	  to	  their	  objects?	  Brentano	  distinguishes	  three	  modes	  of	  intentional	  reference:	  (i)	  presentation,	  (ii)	  acceptance	  and	  rejection,	  (iii)	  love	  and	  hate	  (see	  CHAP.	  9).	  Sensations	  are	  not	  sheer	  presentations	  of	  their	  object:	  seeing	  a	  red	  dot	  does	  involve	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  red	  dot,	  but	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  such	  a	  presentation.	  It	  also	  involves	  a	  “blind	  assertoric	  accepting”	  of	  the	  red	  dot,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  accepts	  it,	  judges	  it	  real.	  This	  primitive	  belief	  in	  the	  primary	  object	  is	  an	  inseparable	  part	  of	  the	  sensation,	  by	  contrast	  to	  a	  merely	  superposed	  act	  that	  would	  merely	  be	  caused	  by	  it,	  as	  is	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  colour	  (1995b:	  92-­‐4,	  168;	  see	  §2.1	  below	  on	  inseparable	  parts).	  
Although	  Brentano	  speaks	  of	  judgment	  as	  being	  intrinsic	  to	  sensations	  (such	  as	  hearing	  sounds),	  it	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  he	  is	  by	  no	  means	  committed	  to	  some	  form	  of	  conceptualist	  approach	  to	  sensations.	  His	  idea	  is	  that	  within	  a	  sensation,	  the	  sensory	  object	  is	  not	  merely	  presented,	  but	  also	  accepted,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  its	  
 4 
existence	  is	  taken	  for	  granted;	  it	  is	  not	  that	  sensory	  contents	  are	  conceptualised	  in	  any	  way	  (1995a:	  209;	  1995b:	  104).	  
Whether	  sensations	  also	  essentially	  involve	  the	  love	  and	  hate	  of	  their	  primary	  and	  secondary	  objects	  is	  an	  issue	  on	  which	  Brentano	  changed	  his	  mind,	  which	  we	  shall	  address	  in	  §3.	  	  
On	  top	  of	  these	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  psychological	  status	  of	  sensations,	  Brentano	  addresses	  the	  following	  questions:	  	  
1.	   How	  are	  sensations	  individuated?	  	  	  2.	   How	  should	  we	  understand	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensations?	  	  	  3.	   Which	  sensation	  belongs	  to	  which	  sense,	  what	  are	  the	  different	  senses?	  	  	  
Contrary	  to	  the	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  psychological	  status	  of	  sensations,	  these	  further	  questions	  are	  answered	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  objects	  of	  sensation.	  Thus:	  	  
1.	   The	  question	  of	  the	  individuation	  of	  sensations	  is	  answered	  by	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  the	  individuation	  of	  sensory	  objects;	  	  2.	   The	  question	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensations	  is	  answered	  through	  Brentano’s	  account	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensory	  qualities;	  	  3.	   The	  question	  of	  the	  number	  of	  senses	  is	  answered	  by	  classifying	  sensory	  qualities	  into	  homogeneous	  kinds.	  	  
Let	  us	  therefore	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  sensory	  objects	  and	  qualities,	  so	  as	  to	  present	  these	  various	  answers.	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2.	  	  Sensory	  Qualities	  
	  
2.1.	  	  Sensory	  objects:	  qualities	  and	  places	  
Sensations	  bear	  on	  objects,	  such	  as	  blue	  spots,	  which	  Brentano	  describes	  as	  “physical”	  and	  “concrete”	  objects.	  This	  terminology	  may	  be	  misleading:	  for	  Brentano	  objects	  of	  sensations	  have	  no	  actual	  existence,	  but	  only	  an	  intentional	  one	  —	  they	  exist	  only	  within	  the	  mind	  (1995a:	  10,	  19,	  88n1,	  92;	  1995b:	  10,	  17;	  1981a:	  208).	  Sensory	  objects	  are	  determinate	  and	  individual.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  abstract,	  intellectual	  or	  “noetic”	  consciousness,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  any	  indeterminate	  or	  general	  features	  (1995b:	  152).	  
Sensory	  objects	  are	  complex:	  they	  are	  made	  of	  different	  parts.	  These	  parts	  are	  of	  two	  sorts:	  	  
•	   The	  first	  are	  separable	  parts,	  such	  as,	  typically,	  spatial	  parts:	  the	  upper	  half	  of	  a	  blue	  spot	  might	  be	  removed	  while	  its	  lower	  half	  remains	  intact.	  	  
•	   The	  second	  are	  inseparable	  parts:	  these	  are,	  to	  begin	  with,	  the	  extension	  and	  the	  quality	  (e.g.,	  colour)	  of	  a	  coloured	  dot,	  which	  Brentano	  calls	  respectively	  its	  spatial	  and	  qualitative	  “determinations”.	  Inseparable	  parts	  cannot	  be	  actually	  separated	  from	  the	  whole	  they	  compose;	  we	  can	  only	  get	  at	  them	  through	  an	  act	  of	  distinction.	  Brentano	  therefore	  calls	  these	  inseparable	  parts	  “distinctional”	  [distinktionelle]	  parts	  (1995b:	  16;	  see	  CHAP.	  17).ii	  	  
All	  sensory	  objects	  therefore	  have	  qualitative	  and	  spatial	  determinations.	  Brentano	  here	  agrees	  with	  the	  “nativists”,	  who,	  contrary	  to	  “empiricists”,	  maintain	  that	  all	  sensations	  have,	  on	  top	  of	  their	  qualitative	  determination,	  also	  spatial	  determination	  (this	  way	  of	  drawing	  the	  nativist/empiricist	  distinction	  comes	  from	  Helmholtz).	  His	  views	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  these	  two	  determinations	  have	  however	  evolved.	  
In	  his	  Descriptive	  Psychology	  (1995b),	  Brentano	  thought	  that	  the	  spatial	  and	  qualitative	  determinations	  were	  nearly	  on	  a	  par.	  He	  describes	  them	  as	  “mutually	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pervading	  parts”,	  and	  equates	  them	  to	  mutually	  dependent	  distinctional	  parts	  of	  sensory	  objects	  (1995b:19);	  likewise	  in	  his	  Theory	  of	  Categories	  (1981a),	  he	  claims	  that	  “determination	  of	  place	  and	  the	  determination	  of	  quality	  are	  so	  closely	  associated	  with	  each	  other	  that	  each	  is	  individuated	  by	  the	  other”	  (1981a:	  72).	  To	  this	  mutual	  dependency	  between	  qualitative	  and	  spatial	  determinations	  corresponds	  a	  mutual	  dependency	  between	  the	  mental	  acts	  directed	  at	  them:	  “If,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  seeing,	  colour	  and	  spatial	  determination	  pervade	  one	  another	  in	  the	  object,	  then	  we	  must	  accordingly	  distinguish	  in	  it	  the	  seeing	  of	  place	  [das	  
Ortsehen]	  and	  the	  seeing	  of	  colour	  [das	  Farbsehen]	  as	  two	  mutually	  pervading	  parts”	  (1995b:	  104;	  see	  also	  1995b:	  152-­‐3).	  	  
Yet	  already	  at	  the	  time,	  Brentano	  ascribes	  some	  priority	  to	  spatial	  determinations	  over	  qualitative	  ones.	  For	  while	  he	  denies	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  sensory	  object	  can	  change	  its	  sensory	  location,	  he	  maintains	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  stationary	  sensory	  object	  can	  change	  its	  colour.	  Qualities	  do	  not	  survive	  changes	  of	  locations,	  but	  locations	  survive	  changes	  of	  qualities	  (1995b:	  19)	  —all	  locations	  need	  is	  some	  quality	  filling	  them.	  While	  colours	  are	  inseparable	  from	  the	  individual	  location	  they	  fill,	  locations	  only	  require	  some	  colour,	  whatever	  it	  is,	  to	  fill	  them.	  In	  other	  terms,	  visual	  qualities	  are	  individually	  dependent	  on	  visual	  locations,	  but	  visual	  locations	  are	  only	  generically	  dependent	  on	  visual	  qualities.	  
Why	  does	  Brentano	  deny	  that	  red	  spots	  can	  move?	  In	  what	  sense	  is	  the	  colour	  of	  a	  blue	  spot	  inseparable	  from	  its	  location?	  This	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  view	  he	  came	  to	  explicitly	  adopt	  around	  1889	  according	  to	  which	  locationsiii	  individuate	  sensory	  objects:	  “The	  principle	  of	  individuation	  for	  sensory	  qualities	  must	  consist	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  spatial	  category”	  (2009:	  132,	  my	  translation;	  see	  also	  1995b:	  19,63).	  Motion,	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  implies	  that	  what	  moves	  remains	  numerically	  the	  same	  across	  places.	  But	  since	  locations	  individuate	  sensory	  objects,	  i.e.,	  since	  the	  numeric	  identity	  of	  a	  sensory	  object	  is	  given	  by	  its	  location,	  motion	  is	  impossible.	  What	  we	  get	  instead	  is	  this:	  a	  first	  sensory	  object,	  say,	  blueness-­‐here,	  which	  ceases	  to	  exist	  just	  when	  another	  object,	  blueness-­‐there	  begins	  to	  exist	  (1995b:	  19).	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A	  corollary	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  sensory	  qualities	  are	  individually	  dependent	  on	  (inseparable	  from)	  the	  place	  they	  fill.	  Brentano	  thus	  notices	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  two	  exactly	  similar	  blue	  spots,	  there	  are	  not	  only	  two	  individual	  places	  —	  the	  ones	  occupied	  by	  the	  spots—	  but	  also	  “two	  individually	  different	  qualities”	  (1995b:	  19),	  making	  Brentano	  an	  upholder	  of	  what	  contemporary	  metaphysicians	  call	  “tropes”.	  
That	  primacy	  of	  place	  over	  qualities	  became	  stronger	  after	  1896,	  when	  Brentano	  ended	  up	  accepting	  the	  existence	  of	  “empty	  phenomenal	  locations”,	  that	  is,	  of	  phenomenal	  —although	  unnoticeable—	  places	  not	  filled	  with	  any	  qualities	  (2009:	  134;	  see	  also	  1981b:	  50;	  1995b:	  169;	  1995a:	  216;	  1988:	  152).	  While	  qualities	  are	  dependent	  on	  locations,	  locations	  are	  no	  longer	  dependent	  —even	  only	  generically—	  on	  the	  qualities	  filling	  them.	  The	  exception	  is	  visual	  places,	  sight	  being	  the	  only	  sense	  in	  which	  no	  empty	  phenomenal	  locations	  are	  to	  be	  found	  (see	  next	  sub-­‐section	  on	  intensity).	  
“Unqualified	  places”	  also	  became	  central	  to	  Brentano’s	  late	  theory	  of	  perception	  in	  a	  second	  respect.	  Brentano	  held	  in	  1917	  that	  all	  localized	  sensory	  qualities	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  at	  certain	  distance	  in	  a	  certain	  direction	  from	  an	  unqualified	  point	  of	  reference	  (1995a:	  311-­‐4),	  corresponding	  to	  what	  we	  would	  naturally	  call	  a	  point	  of	  view	  (which	  is	  however	  the	  same	  for	  all	  senses).	  That	  unique	  and	  empty	  point	  from	  which	  sensory	  objects	  are	  perceived,	  is	  perceived	  in	  modo	  
recto.	  These	  sensory	  objects	  —localized	  sensory	  qualities—	  cannot	  be	  perceived	  in	  
modo	  recto,	  but	  only	  derivatively,	  in	  modo	  obliquo,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  direct	  perception	  of	  that	  empty	  spatial	  point	  of	  reference.	  
That	  evolution	  of	  Brentano’s	  thought	  towards	  a	  hypostatizing	  of	  places	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  sensory	  objects	  is	  paralleled	  by	  a	  similar	  evolution	  in	  his	  metaphysics.iv	  Thus,	  from	  1915	  (see	  1981a:	  208-­‐11;	  1988:	  150-­‐5),	  Brentano	  argues	  that	  space	  is	  the	  only	  physical	  substance,	  that	  accidents	  attach	  to	  part	  of	  that	  unitary	  substance,	  that	  such	  spatial	  parts	  —i.e.	  places—	  can	  be	  empty	  (“the	  portion	  of	  the	  substance	  between	  these	  accidents	  are	  themselves	  free	  of	  accidents”,	  1981a:	  209),	  and	  that	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motion	  of	  substance	  is	  thereby	  impossible	  —all	  we	  have	  is	  a	  succession	  of	  accidents	  at	  different	  places.v	  	  
2.2.	  	  Intensity	  and	  multiple	  qualities:	  Brentano’s	  chessboard	  
Although	  Brentano	  abandoned	  his	  early	  view	  that	  all	  mental	  phenomena	  have	  intensity	  (1995a:	  286),	  he	  never	  gave	  up	  the	  view	  that	  all	  sensations	  have	  intensity.	  His	  view	  is	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  a	  sensation	  consists	  in	  the	  intensity	  on	  the	  sensory	  quality	  towards	  which	  it	  is	  directed	  (1995a:	  120).	  How	  then	  should	  we	  understand	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensory	  qualities?	  	  
Before	  addressing	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  worth	  raising	  another	  one,	  which	  will	  receive	  a	  very	  similar	  answer.	  Compound	  qualities	  are	  sensory	  qualities	  such	  as	  purple,	  orange,	  or	  chords,	  which	  are	  phenomenal	  compounds	  of	  simple	  qualities.	  Brentano	  argues	  that	  compound	  qualities	  are	  real—in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  phenomenal	  difference	  between	  simple	  and	  compound	  qualities	  (2009:	  91-­‐160).	  Besides,	  he	  wants	  to	  maintain	  that	  compound	  qualities	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  impenetrability	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  of	  a	  same	  kind:	  a	  purple	  dot	  is	  composed	  of	  red	  and	  blue,	  yet	  red	  and	  blue	  can	  never	  fill	  the	  very	  same	  place	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time.	  How	  can	  the	  existence	  of	  compound	  qualities	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  impenetrability	  of	  qualities	  of	  a	  same	  kind?	  	  
Brentano’s	  answer	  to	  these	  two	  questions—intensity	  and	  compound	  qualities—	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  our	  sensory	  field	  is	  made	  up	  of	  small	  pixels,	  much	  like	  a	  chessboard,	  which	  are	  each	  filled	  by	  a	  sensory	  quality	  or	  left	  empty.	  Crucially,	  these	  chessboard	  “squares”	  are	  individually	  too	  small	  to	  be	  perceived.	  They	  can	  only	  be	  collectively	  perceived.	  But	  such	  a	  perception	  is	  doomed	  to	  be	  
indistinct:	  since	  we	  cannot	  perceive	  the	  squares	  individually,	  we	  cannot	  perceive	  the	  details	  of	  their	  distribution	  within	  the	  chessboard.	  Suppose	  half	  of	  the	  squares	  of	  such	  a	  chessboard	  are	  red.	  Looking	  at	  it,	  we	  cannot	  see	  where	  exactly	  the	  different	  red	  squares	  are,	  we	  are	  only	  presented	  with	  there	  being	  some	  redness	  in	  that	  whole	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area.	  (The	  original	  presentation	  of	  this	  chessboard	  account	  is	  in	  2009:	  132-­‐4;	  the	  proposal	  is	  then	  appealed	  to	  in	  various	  places:	  1988:	  8,	  147,	  152;	  1981a:	  67-­‐70;	  1981b:	  50-­‐1;	  1995a:	  275–8;	  1995b:	  50).	  
The	  intensity	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  is	  then	  explained	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  a	  sensory	  quality	  is	  more	  intense	  the	  more	  imperceptibly	  small	  pixels	  of	  the	  field	  it	  fills.	  The	  more	  empty	  parts	  there	  are,	  the	  lower	  the	  intensity	  of	  a	  perceived	  quality.	  Intensity	  of	  sensory	  qualities,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  equated	  with	  the	  spatial	  density	  of	  such	  qualities	  (1981b:	  51,	  54).	  That	  account	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensations	  has	  an	  immediate	  consequence	  for	  the	  disputed	  question	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  intensive	  and	  extensive	  magnitudes.	  The	  latter,	  contrary	  to	  the	  former,	  have	  parts.	  Thus	  while	  a	  small	  extensive	  magnitude	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  larger,	  a	  small	  intensive	  magnitude	  is	  never	  a	  part	  of	  a	  large	  one	  (1981b:	  50).	  Thanks	  to	  his	  “chessboard	  account”	  of	  intensity,	  Brentano	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  reject	  intensive	  magnitudes	  (1907:	  176-­‐87)	  and	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  sensation	  is	  in	  fact	  extensive	  (see	  Seron	  2012).	  	  
Brentano	  notes	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  phenomenally	  empty	  pixels	  is	  nonetheless	  impossible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sight	  (while	  it	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  other	  senses),	  since	  the	  absence	  of	  colour	  corresponds	  to	  a	  phenomenally	  positive	  colour:	  black	  (by	  contrast,	  small	  locations	  of	  the	  auditory	  field	  may	  contain	  no	  sound,	  for	  silence,	  by	  contrast	  to	  black,	  is	  not	  a	  positive	  quality	  —silence	  is	  not	  a	  sound).	  According	  to	  Brentano,	  this	  particularity	  of	  vision	  turns	  out	  to	  support	  his	  theory	  of	  intensity.	  Brentano,	  in	  effect,	  agrees	  with	  Hering	  (1874)	  that	  sight	  is	  the	  only	  sense	  where	  no	  differences	  in	  intensity	  can	  be	  found	  (2009:	  134-­‐5;	  1988:	  152).	  
The	  chessboard	  account	  also	  allows	  Brentano	  to	  reconcile	  the	  reality	  of	  compound	  qualities	  with	  the	  impenetrability	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  of	  a	  same	  kind.	  Purple	  is	  equated	  to	  a	  chessboard	  of	  alternately	  blue	  and	  red	  squares.	  Although	  no	  small	  square	  is	  both	  red	  and	  blue,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  impenetrability	  of	  sensory	  qualities,	  the	  indistinct	  perception	  of	  the	  whole	  chessboard	  presents	  us	  with	  red	  and	  blue	  participating	  in	  the	  purple	  whole,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  compound	  colours.	  
 10 
	  
2.3.	  	  The	  classification	  of	  the	  senses	  and	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  
What,	  finally,	  distinguishes	  the	  different	  senses	  and	  how	  many	  senses	  are	  there?	  Brentano’s	  most	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  this	  question	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  his	  text	  “On	  the	  number	  of	  senses”	  (1907:	  157-­‐63).	  Brentano	  rejects	  the	  views	  that	  senses	  should	  be	  individuated	  thanks	  to	  differences	  of	  organs,	  or	  thanks	  to	  differences	  in	  modes	  of	  intentional	  reference	  (all	  senses	  having	  an	  assertoric	  mode	  of	  reference).	  Following	  Aristotle,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  senses	  consists	  in	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  kinds	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  on	  which	  they	  bear.	  Since	  space	  or	  bodily	  motions	  are	  not	  sensory	  qualities,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  of	  space	  and	  no	  sense	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  body	  (the	  sensations	  of	  pressure	  through	  which	  we	  maintain	  our	  equilibrium	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  the	  sensation	  of	  pressure	  on	  our	  skin;	  1907:	  157-­‐63;	  1981b:	  46).	  	  
The	  key	  question	  becomes	  how	  to	  group	  sensory	  qualities	  together.	  Here	  Brentano	  takes	  his	  lead	  from	  Helmholtz,	  who	  argues	  that	  two	  sensory	  qualities	  belong	  to	  a	  same	  kind	  if	  and	  only	  if	  gradual	  transitions	  from	  the	  one	  to	  the	  other	  are	  possible.vi	  While	  Brentano	  first	  considered	  such	  a	  solution	  as	  unproblematic	  (1995a:	  150),	  he	  later	  worries	  that	  Helmholtz’s	  criterion	  is	  not	  secure	  enough	  as	  it	  stands	  (1907:	  158).	  His	  worry	  stems	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  compound	  qualities,	  which	  Brentano	  granted,	  as	  we	  saw.	  To	  travel	  from	  blue	  to	  red,	  one	  passes	  through	  purple,	  which	  is	  a	  compound	  colour	  —a	  mixture	  of	  blue	  and	  red.	  Now,	  given	  the	  possibility	  of	  compound	  qualities,	  one	  may	  also,	  apparently,	  start	  from	  blue,	  pass	  through	  a	  mixture	  of	  blue	  and	  say,	  hot,	  so	  as	  to	  arrive	  at	  pure	  hot.	  	  
The	  dilemma	  is	  then	  the	  following:	  	  
•	   Either	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  “travel”	  from	  one	  simple	  sensory	  quality	  to	  another	  via	  some	  compound	  qualities,	  and	  one	  is	  led	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  is	  only	  
one	  sense	  (for	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  mix	  qualities	  of	  different	  kinds	  —e.g.	  red	  and	  hot);	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•	   Or	  one	  forbids	  transit	  through	  compound	  qualities,	  and	  one	  is	  led	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  blue	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  red,	  for	  one	  can	  no	  longer	  travel	  from	  red	  to	  blue.	  	  
We	  get	  either	  only	  one	  sense,	  or	  too	  many.	  Brentano’s	  solution	  to	  this	  worry	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  compound	  qualities	  are	  necessary	  to	  mediate	  between	  simple	  qualities,	  but	  to	  deny	  that	  red	  and	  hot,	  by	  contrast	  to	  red	  and	  blue,	  can	  compose	  a	  compound	  quality.	  Why	  can’t	  red	  and	  hot	  be	  mixed	  together?	  Brentano	  believes	  that	  all	  kinds	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  “light	  and	  dark”	  in	  some	  sense:	  thus	  there	  are	  light	  and	  dark	  colours,	  but	  also	  light	  and	  dark	  tones	  (high	  and	  low),	  light	  and	  dark	  tastes	  (sweet	  and	  bitter),	  light	  and	  dark	  temperatures	  (cold	  and	  warm).	  However,	  qualities	  of	  different	  kinds	  are	  said	  to	  be	  light	  and	  dark	  only	  in	  an	  analogous	  sense	  (1981b:	  47;	  see	  also	  1995b:	  122;	  1907:	  162-­‐3,	  215n17);	  only	  qualities	  which	  are	  light	  and	  dark	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  can	  be	  mixed,	  and	  hence	  are	  qualities	  of	  a	  same	  kind.	  Colours	  and	  sounds	  alternately	  filling	  imperceptibly	  small	  pixels	  will	  never	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  medium	  degree	  of	  clarity,	  because	  they	  are	  light	  and	  dark	  only	  in	  an	  
analogous	  sense.	  Hence	  Helmholtz’s	  criterion	  of	  continuous	  transition	  is	  reliable,	  as	  long	  as	  only	  genuine	  compound	  qualities	  —compounds	  of	  qualities	  of	  a	  same	  kind	  of	  clarity—	  are	  allowed	  to	  mediate	  between	  simple	  qualities.	  The	  different	  kinds	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  therefore	  boil	  down	  to	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  light	  and	  dark:	  “We	  determine	  the	  number	  of	  senses	  according	  to	  the	  number	  of	  genera	  of	  light	  and	  dark”	  (1995b:	  122).	  
This	  idea,	  that	  sensory	  qualities	  are	  grouped	  together	  thanks	  to	  their	  kind	  of	  clarity,	  led	  Brentano	  to	  the	  astonishing	  view	  that	  sensory	  qualities	  are	  of	  only	  three	  kinds:	  colours,	  sounds,	  and	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  third	  sense,	  which	  he	  calls	  the	  “Spürsinn”,	  which	  includes	  temperatures,	  pressures,	  tastes,	  smells	  but	  also	  algedonic	  qualities	  (i.e.,	  the	  qualities	  presented	  by	  pleasure	  and	  pain),	  as	  we	  shall	  now	  see.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  Brentano	  thinks	  that	  there	  are	  only	  three	  senses:	  sight,	  hearing,	  and	  the	  “Spürsinn”.	  While	  the	  group	  of	  quality	  proper	  to	  the	  Spürsinn	  may	  sound	  heterogeneous,	  Brentano	  maintains	  that	  they	  are	  all	  light	  and	  dark	  in	  the	  same	  
 12 
sense,	  one	  of	  his	  main	  argument	  being	  that	  sensations	  of	  temperature	  and	  pressure,	  or	  sensations	  of	  temperature	  and	  taste,	  commonly	  influence	  each	  other	  (1995b:	  47-­‐8;	  1907:	  160-­‐3).	  	  
3.	  	  Sensory	  Pleasures	  and	  Pains	  
	  
3.1.	  	  Pleasures	  and	  pains	  as	  affective	  sensations	  
Brentano	  takes	  sensory	  pleasure	  [sinnliche	  Lust]	  and	  sensory	  pain	  [sinnliche	  
Schmerz]	  to	  be	  opposites	  and	  stresses	  that	  neither	  of	  them	  are	  sensory	  qualities:	  both	  are	  intentional	  acts.	  Brentano	  thus	  strongly	  opposes	  Stumpf,	  who	  held	  such	  affective	  sensations	  [Gefühlsempfidungen]	  to	  be	  sensory	  qualities	  (see	  Brentano	  2009:176-­‐90	  for	  Brentano’s	  objection	  to	  Stumpf’s	  views).	  
How	  do	  sensory	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  refer	  to	  their	  object?	  For	  Brentano,	  sensory	  pains	  and	  pleasures	  are	  affective	  acts,	  together	  with	  “longing,	  feeling,	  hoping,	  fearing,	  anger”	  (1981b:	  59;	  see	  CHAP.	  11).	  One	  might	  have	  thought	  that,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  sensory	  qualities	  are	  presented,	  they	  might	  be	  loved	  or	  enjoyed:	  that	  we	  could	  refer	  to	  them	  affectively.	  But	  Brentano	  rejects	  this.	  What	  we	  enjoy,	  in	  sensory	  pleasures	  and	  pains,	  are	  not	  the	  localized	  sensory	  qualities,	  but	  the	  sensations	  directed	  towards	  them:	  “where	  I	  hear	  a	  harmonious	  sound,	  the	  pleasure	  which	  I	  feel	  is	  not	  actually	  pleasure	  in	  the	  sound	  but	  pleasure	  in	  the	  hearing.”	  (1995a:	  90;	  see	  also	  1995a:	  144;	  1981b:	  14).	  This	  clearly	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  sensory	  pleasures	  are	  second-­‐order	  acts	  whose	  primary	  objects	  would	  be	  sensations:	  the	  pleasure	  is	  rather	  the	  sensation	  itself,	  which	  on	  top	  of	  presenting	  its	  primary	  object	  (the	  localized	  sensory	  quality)	  and	  presenting	  itself,	  also	  affectively	  refers	  to	  itself	  (but	  not	  to	  its	  primary	  object).	  Thus	  among	  the	  three	  modes	  of	  reference	  involved	  in	  sensations,	  only	  presentation	  and	  judgement	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  secondary	  object	  (the	  sensations)	  and	  at	  the	  primary	  object	  (the	  sensory	  quality).	  Love	  and	  hate	  are	  only	  directed	  at	  the	  secondary	  object.	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  We	  can	  still	  say,	  however,	  that	  sensory	  pleasures	  have	  sensory	  qualities	  as	  objects.	  But	  when	  we	  do,	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  is	  true	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  take	  pleasure	  in	  the	  sensations	  which	  present	  these	  sensory	  qualities.	  In	  Brentano’s	  terminology,	  we	  take	  pleasure	  in	  the	  sensation	  in	  modo	  recto,	  and	  in	  the	  sensory	  quality	  only	  in	  modo	  obliquo	  (1981b:	  59;	  see	  Chilsholm	  1987;	  Mulligan	  2004;	  Massin	  2013	  for	  discussions).	  
Which	  sensations	  can	  be	  sensory	  pleasures?	  Brentano	  changed	  his	  view	  on	  this	  matter.	  He	  first	  thought	  that	  all	  sensations	  are	  accompanied	  by	  some	  pleasant	  or	  unpleasant	  sensory	  feeling.	  No	  sensations	  are	  neutral,	  and	  hence,	  no	  sensory	  quality	  can	  be	  sensed	  indifferently.	  At	  best	  some	  sensation	  “involves	  a	  mixture	  of	  pleasant	  and	  unpleasant	  feeling”	  (1995a:	  151).	  Brentano	  later	  came	  to	  accept	  neutral	  sensations	  (1995a:	  276;	  1995b:	  92,	  168;	  1981b:	  48),	  and	  consequently,	  to	  considerably	  restrict	  the	  class	  of	  sensory	  pleasures.	  According	  to	  this	  later	  view,	  all	  sensations	  of	  sight	  and	  hearing,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  (not	  all)	  sensations	  of	  the	  Spürsinn	  (1981b:	  48)	  are	  held	  to	  be	  essentially	  neutral.	  Only	  a	  sub-­‐class	  of	  the	  sensations	  of	  the	  Spürsinn	  are	  genuine	  sensory	  pleasures	  and	  pains.	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  the	  pleasure	  of	  hearing,	  of	  seeing,	  or	  of	  tactual	  perception,	  what	  happens	  in	  fact	  is	  that	  our	  visual,	  auditory	  or	  tactile	  sensations	  are	  accompanied	  by	  co-­‐sensations	  (Mitempfindungen)	  which	  are	  bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  (2009:	  84,	  171).	  	  
3.2.	  	  Algedonic	  qualities	  
On	  such	  bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains,	  Brentano	  never	  changed	  his	  mind:	  already	  in	  1874,	  at	  the	  time	  he	  was	  accepting	  other	  sensory	  pleasures	  (visual,	  auditory,	  tactile,	  etc.),	  Brentano	  considered	  these	  bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  to	  have	  a	  special	  status.vii	  What	  are	  the	  objects	  of	  these	  paradigmatic	  sensory	  pleasures	  and	  pains?	  They	  are	  directed	  at	  a	  sui	  generis	  class	  of	  sensory	  qualities,	  which	  fill	  space	  in	  the	  very	  same	  way	  as	  colours,	  sounds,	  and	  other	  sensory	  qualities,	  and	  which	  are	  distinct	  from	  sounds,	  colours,	  pressures,	  temperatures,	  tastes,	  and	  smells	  (1995a:	  82-­‐3;	  1973:	  113;	  1981b:	  13,	  46).	  Some	  instances	  of	  these	  are	  the	  quality	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corresponding	  to	  the	  sensation	  of	  being	  cut,	  burned,	  or	  tickled	  (1995a:	  82-­‐3)	  or	  “stuck	  with	  a	  needle”	  (1981b:	  46).	  Let	  us	  call	  such	  sensory	  qualities	  “algedonic	  qualities”.	  Brentano	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  qualities	  constitute	  a	  specific	  sub-­‐class	  of	  sensory	  qualities.	  In	  his	  late	  view,	  algedonic	  qualities	  are	  included	  within	  the	  third	  sense,	  the	  Spürsinn.	  Among	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  third	  sense,	  and	  in	  fact	  among	  all	  sensory	  qualities,	  algedonic	  qualities	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  whose	  sensations	  is	  necessarily	  affective:	  warmth	  or	  pressure,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  objects	  of	  neutral	  sensations	  (1981b:	  48).	  
Bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  are	  of	  special	  importance	  to	  Brentano	  for,	  as	  he	  repeatedly	  notes,	  they	  constitute	  the	  most	  pressing	  objection	  to	  his	  view	  that	  all	  mental	  phenomena	  are	  intentional,	  an	  objection	  he	  attributes	  to	  Hamilton	  (see	  note	  1	  above).	  Brentano’s	  answer	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  straightforward:	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  bodily	  pains,	  one	  should	  distinguish	  the	  pain,	  which	  is	  a	  sensation,	  from	  the	  algedonic	  quality	  that	  the	  pain	  presents.	  But	  Brentano	  does	  not	  only	  want	  to	  answer	  the	  objection	  from	  bodily	  pain;	  he	  also	  takes	  great	  care	  explaining	  its	  intuitive	  appeal.	  How	  is	  it	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  conflate	  the	  pain-­‐presentations	  with	  the	  pain-­‐qualities,	  while	  we	  are	  not	  in	  the	  least	  tempted	  to	  conflate	  the	  pleasure	  taken	  in	  a	  sound	  with	  the	  sound	  towards	  which	  it	  is	  —obliquely—	  directed?	  Brentano	  advances	  two	  answers.	  	  
The	  first	  is	  that	  we	  typically	  have	  only	  one	  name	  for	  the	  affective	  acts	  and	  for	  the	  algedonic	  qualities.	  This	  is	  so,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “pain”	  (1995a:	  84;	  1981b:	  118).	  Such	  equivocations	  are	  “one	  of	  the	  main	  obstacle	  in	  recognizing	  distinctions”	  (1995a:	  84).	  
The	  second	  explanation	  is	  more	  complex	  (it	  appears	  first	  in	  1995a:	  83-­‐4,	  and	  is	  reformulated	  in	  1995a:	  145	  and	  1981b:	  14).	  It	  starts	  from	  the	  observation	  above	  that	  bodily	  pleasures	  and	  pains	  are	  typically	  co-­‐sensations,	  sensations	  which	  accompany	  other	  auditory,	  visual,	  tactile,	  etc.	  sensations.	  For	  instance,	  when	  we	  have	  some	  bodily	  pleasure	  or	  pain	  (say,	  a	  tickle),	  we	  have	  not	  only	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  corresponding	  algedonic	  quality	  (some	  tickling	  quality),	  but	  also	  the	  presentation	  of	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some	  other	  quality	  (say,	  some	  slight	  pressure).	  We	  are	  then	  presented,	  primarily,	  with	  two	  physical	  localized	  sensory	  qualities	  (an	  algedonic	  tickling	  quality,	  and	  a	  pressure	  extent),	  and,	  secondarily,	  with	  two	  mental	  sensations	  referring	  to	  them	  (a	  bodily	  pleasure	  and	  a	  neutral	  tactile	  sensation).	  	  
Now,	  Brentano	  notices:	  “when	  several	  sensory	  phenomena	  appear	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  are	  not	  infrequently	  regarded	  as	  one”(1995a:	  43).	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  conflate	  the	  algedonic	  qualities	  with	  the	  other	  qualities	  with	  which	  they	  are	  associated.	  In	  our	  example,	  we	  tend	  to	  conflate	  the	  tickling	  quality	  with	  the	  pressure	  quality.	  Besides,	  on	  the	  mental	  side,	  we	  tend	  to	  retain	  only	  the	  sensation	  whose	  affective	  self-­‐reference	  is	  stronger,	  namely	  the	  one	  which	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  algedonic	  qualities.	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  we	  have	  two	  sensations	  directed	  at	  two	  corresponding	  qualities,	  we	  end	  up	  believing	  that	  we	  have	  only	  one	  affective	  sensation	  (of	  tickling)	  directed	  at	  one	  sensory	  quality	  (of	  slight	  pressure).	  Suppose	  now,	  Brentano	  pursues,	  that	  the	  sensation	  of	  pressure	  ceases.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  we	  are	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  have	  an	  affective	  sensation	  of	  tickling	  to	  which	  corresponds	  no	  object.	  We	  are	  thus	  naturally	  led	  to	  fail	  to	  notice	  the	  distinction	  between	  pains	  or	  tickles	  and	  their	  objects.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	  Wrapping	  up,	  Brentano’s	  account	  of	  sensations	  and	  sensory	  qualities	  contains	  the	  seeds	  not	  only	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  his	  general	  theory	  of	  intentionality	  —the	  distinctions	  between	  acts	  and	  objects,	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  objects,	  between	  three	  modes	  of	  intentional	  reference,	  the	  theory	  of	  indistinct	  perception—	  but	  also	  of	  central	  strands	  of	  his	  metaphysics	  —the	  primacy	  of	  place,	  the	  concept	  of	  inseparable/distinctional	  part,	  the	  principle	  of	  impenetrability,	  not	  to	  mention	  his	  account	  of	  the	  spatial	  continuum	  (1988:	  8,	  147).	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That	  Brentano’s	  metaphysics	  was	  influenced	  by	  his	  account	  of	  sensory	  qualities	  may	  be	  found	  surprising:	  after	  all,	  	  Brentano	  insists	  that	  such	  qualities	  are	  not	  real	  (see	  §2.1).	  Let	  us,	  to	  conclude,	  try	  to	  dissolve	  that	  air	  of	  paradox.	  Brentano’s	  anti-­‐realism	  about	  sensory	  qualities	  is	  moderate	  in	  the	  following	  respect.	  Contrary	  to	  	  “a	  subjectively	  subjective	  sensation”	  (see	  n.1),	  “a	  color	  which	  is	  not	  presented”	  (1995:	  93),	  Brentano	  urges,	  is	  not	  contradictory.	  He	  thus	  strongly	  critizes	  Bain’s	  view	  that	  unseen	  colors	  would	  be	  self-­‐contradictory	  (1995a:	  92-­‐4).	  Realism	  about	  sensory	  qualities	  is,	  for	  Brentano,	  not	  logically	  defective	  but	  only	  inconsistent	  with	  empirical	  science.	  This	  is	  what	  allows	  him	  to	  “fictitiously”	  treat	  sensory	  qualities	  as	  real	  (1995b:	  17).	  Still,	  what	  licenses	  the	  move	  from	  descriptions	  of	  such	  fictitious	  objects	  to	  metaphysical	  conclusions?	  Brentano’s	  tacit	  assumption	  here	  is	  that	  the	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                                                i	  The	  expression	  “subjectively	  subjective”	  comes	  from	  Hamilton	  (1882,	  vol.	  2:	  432,	  463)	  who	  uses	  it	  to	  describe	  feelings	  of	  pain	  and	  pleasure.	  Brentano	  often	  quotes	  this	  expression	  (1995a:	  89,	  91,	  144,	  244;	  1981b:	  59),	  which	  he	  takes	  to	  capture	  the	  main	  alternative	  to	  his	  thesis	  that	  all	  mental	  episodes	  are	  intentional,	  but	  which	  he	  also	  deem	  to	  be	  “self-­‐contradictory”.	  
 ii	  For	  a	  detailled	  presentation	  of	  Brentano’s	  theory	  of	  parts,	  see	  Mulligan	  &	  Smith	  (1985).	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                                                                                                                                             iii	  By	  which	  Brentano	  means	  absolute	  rather	  than	  relative	  locations	  (1981b:	  50).	  He	  stresses,	  besides,	  that	  local	  determinations	  are	  homogeneous	  accross	  all	  senses	  —visual	  and	  auditory	  locations	  are	  not	  of	  different	  kinds,	  pace	  Berkeley	  (1981b:	  54-­‐5).	  
 iv	  See	  Kastil	  notes	  134	  and	  230	  in	  Brentano	  (1981a)	  and	  Smith	  (1987,	  1989).	  
 v	  See	  Smith	  (1989)	  and	  Schultess	  (1999)	  for	  presentations	  of	  this	  late	  view	  of	  Brentano,	  which	  anticipates	  in	  several	  respects	  the	  view	  of	  supersubstantivalism	  discussed	  in	  contemporary	  metaphysics	  (see	  esp.	  Schaffer	  2009).	  
 vi	  Such	  a	  view	  were	  to	  be	  endorsed	  by	  Carnap	  (1967),	  Goodman	  (1977),	  or	  Clark	  (1993).	  
 vii	  Brentano	  lacks	  a	  clear	  terminology	  to	  refer	  to	  these	  —he	  sometimes	  speaks	  of	  “the	  pleasure	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  sense	  of	  feeling	  [Gefühlssinnes]”	  (1995a:	  145).	  
 
viii I	  am	  very	  grateful	  to	  Uriah	  Kriegel	  for	  invaluable	  comments	  on	  this	  paper.	  Thanks	  to	  Riccardo	  Braglia,	  CEO,	  Elsin	  Health	  Care	  and	  the	  Fundazione	  Reginaldus	  (Lugano)	  for	  financial	  support	  of	  the	  work	  published	  here.	  	  
 
